In recent times, an alarming narrative has emerged within the Malaysian blogosphere, suggesting a historical event that appears to be a misinterpretation or perhaps a deliberate misinformation campaign. The claim revolves around a so called Malay prince named Manabharana from Srivijaya, purportedly attacking and conquering the Chola kingdom. This misleading story has gained traction and is spreading like wildfire across various social media platforms. The need to address and rectify such inaccuracies is crucial not only for the sake of historical accuracy but also for fostering a responsible and informed online community. To delve into the matter, it is essential to clarify that historical records reveal the existence of multiple individuals named Manabharana throughout history. However, a nuanced understanding reveals that all these figures were Tamils (Damila) hailing from the Pandya kingdom, with references to their exploits documented in Tamil inscriptions and Sri Lankan chronicles...
Part 7: The Tamil Soldier and the Dravidian Diaspora
by
D.P.
Sivaram
[courtesy:
Lanka
Guardian,
August
15,
1992,
pp.12-13
and
28;
prepared
by
Sachi
Sri
Kantha,
for
the
electronic
record]
The
idea
of
the
‘modern
Indian
army’
is
rarely
associated
with
the
Tamils.
The
nature
or
its
ethnic
composition
generates
the
impression
that
it
is
a
predominantly
north
Indian
phenomenon.
This
impression
has
become
so
strongly
established
that
the
military
history
of
the
British
Empire’s
rise
has
been
studied
in
recent
times
in
connection
with
the
role
of
the
‘martial
peoples’
of
north
India
in
the
British
Indian
army.
The
tenacity
and
power
of
this
‘impression’
in
modern
scholarship
is
best
illustrated
in
the
argument
of
David
Washbrook:
"The
role
the
British
Indian
army
played
in
international
affairs
over
the
course
of
the
19th
century
however,
lifts
it
out
of
the
context
of
British
Indian
relations
and
places
it
in
a
broader
global
perspective.
It
was
not
an
army
intended
primarily
for
domestic
defence
and
police
duties
in
India.
Rather,
it
was
the
army
of
British
Imperialism,
formal
and
informal,
which
operated
worldwide,
opening
up
markets
to
the
products
of
industrial
revolution,
subordinating
labour
forces
to
the
dominating
of
capital
and
bringing
to
‘benighted’
civilizations
the
enlightened
values
of
Christianity
and
Rationality.
The
Indian
army
was
the
iron
fist
in
the
velvet
glove
of
Victorian
expansionism.Moreover,
because
the
British
Empire
was
the
principal
agency
through
which
the
world
system
functioned
in
this
era,
the
Indian
army
was
in
a
real
sense
the
major
coercive
force
behind
the
internationalization
of
industrial
capitalism.
Paradoxically
(or
not!),
the
martialization
of
north
Indian
society
and,
in
many
ways
the
feudalization
of
its
agrarian
relations,
were
direct
corrolaries
of
the
development
of
capitalism
on
a
world
scale
during
the
19th
century."
(Washbrook:
1990)
Washbrook’s
view
is
based
on
what
the
Indian
army
was
towards
the
latter
part
of
the
nineteenth
century.
It
is
underpinned
by
an
"impression"
which
arose
many
years
after
the
British
had
established
their
strategic
hold
on
India
and
had
laid
the
Empire’s
foundation
with
what
was
known
as
their
‘Coastal
Army’
which
was
built
up
in
the
latter
half
of
the
18th
century,
mainly
with
Tamil
soldiers.
The
British
succeeded
in
empire-building
not
by
martialising
dominant
north
Indian
military
caste
communities,
but
by
building
up
a
cheap
but
loyal
and
effective
army
of
predominantly
Tamil
soldiers.
Until
the
latter
half
of
the
19th
century,
it
was
the
Tamil
Christian
soldier
who
was
the
main
coercive
force
behind
the
expansion
of
the
Empire
in
the
subcontinent
and
elsewhere.
The
British
recruitment
handbook
for
Madras
classes,
says
"It
can
truthfully
be
said
that
the
Coast
Army
was
mainly
instrumental
in
conquering
India
for
the
British."
(p.8)
The
Tamil
soldier
was
seen
as
the
bearer
of
the
Sword
and
the
Bible
–
with
few
religious
and
caste
prejudices
which
madehim
suitable
for
expeditions
beyond
the
sea
unlike
his
more
expensive
brethren
in
north
India.
Contrary
to
what
Washbrook
claims,
the
early
phase
of
British
overseas
expansion
in
East,
West
and
South
Asia
was
not
based
on
the
martialisation
of
north
Indian
society,
but
on
the
south
Indian
alternative
to
its
military
labour
market
–
the
loyal
classes
of
Tamils.
"During
this
whole
period,
as
always
throughout
its
existence,
the
Coast
Army
was
specially
noteworthy
for
the
cheerful
alacrity
with
which
its
regiments
have
volunteered
of
service
overseas.
The
Bengal
regiments
on
many
occasions
refused
to
embark
for
foreign
service,
on
the
plea
that
it
was
contrary
to
their
religion.
But
the
Coast
Army
willingly
embarked,
and
took
a
leading
part
in
many
successful
expeditions,
including
Manila
(1762),
Mahe
(1779),
Ceylon
(1782
and
1795),
Amboyna
and
the
Spice
Islands
(1796),
Egypt
(1801-02),
Bourbon
and
Mauritius
(1810)
and
Java
(1811-12)".
The
Coast
Army
took
part
in
the
final
expedition
against
the
King
of
Kandy
which
was
followed
by
the
first
war
in
Burma
(1824-26).
The
first
war
by
the
British
in
China
was
also
fought
by
them
in
1840-42
where
the
37th
Madras
Infantry
was
made
grenadier
battalion
for
its
distinguished
conduct.
Sir
Hugh
Gough
reported
on
their
service
in
the
China
war
that
"their
perseverance
and
gallantry
before
the
enemy
have
secured
for
them
the
confidence
of
the
British
European
soldiers."
(Recruitment
Handbook
for
Madras
Classes,
p.6)
Even
a
brief
study
of
the
history
of
the
Coast
Army
and
the
Tamil
soldiers
who
were
recruited
into
it
would
reveal
that
the
‘military
agency’
which
"conveyed
British
capitalist
power
to
areas
of
the
world
(including
the
South
Asian
hinterland)
it
could
not
otherwise
have
reached"
had
a
very
small
proportion
of
north
Indian
military
groups.
Washbrook’s
argument
that
the
World
Capitalist
system
which
the
British
Empire
helped
so
much
to
expand
rested
heavily
on
the
intermediation
of
the
Indian
army
and
that
without
it
and
similar
agencies
constituted
outside
the
European
capitalism
core,
"the
forces
of
world
capitalism
would
have
been
ethnic,
much
weaker
or
else
of
a
very
different
kind"
is
plausible
but
the
argument
that
harnessing
the
dynamic
potential
of
the
readily
available
north
Indian
military
groups
made
it
cheaper
for
the
British
to
rapidly
expand
their
empire,
is
untenable
in
view
of
the
two
most
critical
phases
which
determined
the
hold
of
the
English
on
the
subcontinent.
The
first
phase
begins
towards
the
middle
of
the
18th
century.
It
was
the
contest
with
the
French
that
first
compelled
the
British
to
abandon
their
policy
in
India
till
then,
that
was
was
bad
for
trade,
and
raise
local
troops.
There
was
in
the
subcontinent
at
that
time
paramilitary
caste
groups
whose
services
could
be
obtained
for
a
fee.
The
British
unlike
the
great
Indian
princedoms
in
that
era
could
not
afford
the
soldiery
of
the
high
caste
martial
groups
although
they
very
much
desired
them.
From
the
proceedings
of
the
government,
dated
7th
May
1770,
it
appears
that
the
Sepoy
battalions
then
consisted
of
Mohamedans,
Tamils
and
Telugus,
but
no
details
of
caste
are
given.
It
may
be
inferred
that
the
number
of
Brahmans,
Rajputs
and
Maharattas
in
the
Madras
army
was
very
small.
It
is
clear
that
the
authorities
were
desirous
of
restricting
enlistments
to
men
of
good
caste,
but
it
is
equally
clear
that
this
wasnot
practicable
during
the
last
(18th)
century."
Again
in
1795,
it
is
stated
that
"owing
to
the
small
pay
of
the
sepoy
and
the
high
price
of
rice,
considerable
difficulty
was
experienced
in
obtaining
good
recruits,
and
the
battalions
were
kept
up
to
their
proper
strength
by
accepting
undersized
men
and
those
of
low
caste."
(Phytian
Adams:
1943).
Yet
Stringer
Lawrence
and
Clive
succeeded
in
making
the
cheap
low
caste
Tamil
sepoys
into
an
army
with
which
the
English
were
able
to
establish
themselves
as
the
main
European
trading
group
in
India,
in
the
contest
with
the
French.
It
later
won
all
the
crucial
battles
that
subjugated
most
of
India
during
the
course
of
the
seventy
five
years
since
recruitment
of
the
first
Tamil
sepoy
levies
began
in
the
northern
parts
of
Tamilnadu
in
1746.
The
East
India
company
established
its
first
military
department
at
Madras
in
1752.
The
main
reason
behind
the
rapid
rise
of
the
British
in
this
era
was
their
low
cost
but
hardy
army.
The
major
Indian
kingdoms
of
the
time,
although
possessed
of
modern
and
larger
forces
were
falling
into
financial
difficulties
in
maintaining
their
expensive
high
caste
soldiery
whose
pay
arrears
was
frequent
cause
for
mutiny.
The
English
fought
with
the
advantage
of
an
extremely
loyal
army
which
did
not
rebel
for
pay.
The
Recruitment
Handbook
of
the
Madras
classes
records
"never
were
these
qualities
more
fully
tried
than
in
the
war
with
Hyder.
The
pay
of
the
army
was
sixteen
months
in
arrears,
famine
raged
all
over
the
country,
the
enemy
was
at
the
gates
offering
large
bounty
and
pay
to
our
Sepoys
to
desert,
but
in
vain.
Under
all
these
circumstances
severe
action
were
fought.
Their
conduct
during
the
war
excited
the
admiration
of
all
who
knew
it,
and
Frederick
the
Great
of
Prussia
was
known
to
have
said,
"after
reading
Orme’s
account
of
the
war,
that
had
he
the
command
of
troops
who
acted
like
the
sepoys
on
that
occasion,
he
could
conquer
all
Europe."(9)
The
second
crucial
phase
in
which
the
future
of
the
British
as
an
Empire
building
power
was
determined
was
the
period
in
which
the
Indian
Mutiny
erupted
in
North
India.
Again,
it
was
the
loyal
Coast
Army
that
helped
the
English
survive
the
Mutiny.
It
was
the
Mutiny
that
made
the
British
reorganize
the
Indian
army
into
that
form
which
Washbrook
considers
in
his
thesis.
"In
1857-58,
came
the
great
Mutiny
of
the
army
in
Bengal,
when
the
Coast
Army
displayed
its
loyalty
and
devotion
in
no
uncertain
manner.
In
a
despatch
dated
the
19th
August
1859,
the
Secretary
of
State
of
India
said,
‘The
commander-in-chiefs
Minute
contains
only
a
slight
sketch
of
the
important
services
rendered
by
the
Madras
army
during
the
great
contest
in
the
North
of
India.
The
great
fact
has
been
the
perfect
fidelity
of
that
army
and
the
perfect
loyalty
of
the
23
millions
of
persons
who
inhabit
this
Presidency,
which
enabled
the
resources
of
the
South
of
India
to
be
freely
put
forth
in
support
of
our
hard-pressed
country
men
in
North."
Lieut-General
Sir
Patrick
Grant
said,
"The
services
in
the
field
of
the
Troops
of
this
Presidency
employed
in
the
suppression
or
the
Rebellion
and
the
Mutiny
are
now
a
matter
of
history,
and
the
glowing
terms
in
which
they
have
been
recognized
must
endure
for
ever,
an
unperishable
record
of
this
noble
soldiers.
It
can
never
be
forgotten
that,
to
their
immortal
honour,
the
native
troop
of
the
Madras
army
have
been,
in
the
words
of
the
Earl
of
Ellenborough,
faithful
found
among
the
faithless."
The
Dravidian
ideology
was
underpinned
by
the
idea
of
the
loyal
Tamil
soldier
of
British
Coast
Army,
bringing
to
"benighted"
civilizations
the
enlightened
values
of
Christianity
and
Rationality.
Caldwell
and
his
successors
elaborated
a
theory
of
a
Tamil
Diaspora
as
the
bedrock
of
Protestantism
and
the
English
Empire
on
this
idea.
Bishop
N.C.Sargant,
who
like
Caldwell,
was
the
Church
of
England’s
Bishop
of
Tinnevely
spells
it
out
clearly
in
his
‘Dispersion
of
the
Tamil
Church’:
"The
Tamils
are
great
soldiers;
they
went
with
the
army
along
with
their
families
and
lived
in
its
newly
established
camps
and
in
the
newly
captured
territories…they
were
excellent
instruments
for
establishing
the
Church
among
the
Telugu
and
Kannada
speaking
peoples."
"There
is
much
evidence
to
show
that
Tamil
soldiers
–
of
the
British
Indian
Army
–
and
those
(Tamils)
who
followed
the
army
took
the
gospel
with
them
to
the
other
parts
of
India."
(Sargant:
1940,
p.32
and
p.68)
About
the
intention
of
his
word,
Sargant
says,
"The
Dispersion
of
the
Jews
was
a
preparation
for
the
spread
of
Christianity
in
the
ancient
world.
Similarly
can
it
be
said
that
the
Dispersion
of
the
Tamil
church
helped
the
missionaries?
The
first
Apostles
found
some
God
feating
Jews,
as
their
first
believers.
Did
the
missionaries
find
the
Tamils
perceptive…was
this
race
the
first
fruit
of
Christian
work?
I
tried
to
find
answers
to
such
questions…This
research
made
me
understand
that
Christ
realised
many
unexpected
and
inexplicable
things
through
the
Dispersion
of
the
Tamils
and
the
Tamil
Church."
Sargant,
like
Caldwell
and
Bishop
Whitehead
before
him,
believed
that
research
into
ancient
Dravidian
forms
of
expression
found
in
Tamil
would
reveal
that
there
were
many
surprising
words
and
ideas
which
denoted
Christian
concepts
such
as
that
of
sin.
"Like
the
ancient
Hebrews
the
ancient
Dravidians
also
tried
to
lead
a
righteous
spiritual
life."(p.3)
The
close
connection
between
the
British
Indian
army’s
early
conquests,
the
Society
for
the
Propagation
of
the
Gospel
(S.P.G.),
the
Dispersion
of
the
English
Church,
and
the
Tamils
of
Bishop
Caldwell’s
flock
in
Tinnevely
is
described
by
Sargant
in
detail
(chapters
2,
3,
5).
Thus
the
Tamil
soldier,
the
Tamil
Diaspora
and
the
Dravidian
movement
came
to
constitute
a
basis
of
the
British
Imperial
project.
The
nationalist
reaction
to
this
project
in
the
Tamil
country,
articulated
by
the
terrorist
movement,
proclaimed
modern
Tamil
militarism
as
the
means
of
national
emancipation
from
British
rule.
References
(1)
Recruitment
handbooks
of
the
Indian
Army
series.
Madras
Classes,
by
Lieut-Col.G.E.D.Mouat,
revised
by
Capt.G.Kennedy
Cassels,
New
Delhi:
Govt.of
India
Press,
1938.
(2)
I
have
used
a
Tamil
translation
of
Sargant’s
book.
The
Dispersion
of
the
Tamil
Church,
N.C.Sargant,
1940;
translated
into
Tamil
by
Rev.C.L.Vethakkan,
1964.
(3)
Madras
Infantry
1748-1943,
Lt.Col.Edward
Gwynee
Phythiam
Adams,
Govt.
Press,
Madras,
1943.
(4)
An
interesting
study
of
the
military
labour
market
in
north
India
has
been
done
recently
by
Ditk.H.Kloff-Naukar,
Rajput
and
Sepoy:
The
Ethnohistory
of
the
Military
Labour
Market
in
Hindustan
1450-1850,
Cambridge
University
Press,
New
York,
1990.
(5)
History
of
the
Madras
Army,
Lt.Col.W.J.Wilson,
Madras
Govt.
Press,
5
vols.,
1882-89.
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